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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Sunnyside industrial & Professional Park, L.L.C. ("SiPP") is an ldaho limited liability company.
Sunnyside Park Utiiities, inc. ("Sunnyside Utiiities") is an idaho corporation. SiPP and Sunnyside Utilities
(collectively "Sunnyside") each have their principle place of business in Bonneviiie County, Idaho. SiPP is
developing a 77 acre parcel of commercial property in Bonneviiie County, idaho. Sunnyside Utilities
provides sewer and water services to some of the developed iots in the 77 acre parcel. (R. p. 101).
in 1996, SIPP obtained a permit from Respondent, Eastern ldaho Public Health District, formerly
known as District Seven Health Department ("D7HD1'),for construction of the first phase of a central
septic system to serve the subdivision. See Agency Record, Petitioners' Exhibit C. D7HD inspected the
construction of the central septic system on August 23,1996 and determined that the septic system
construction was in substantial compliance with approved plans and specifications and that the facilities
complied with the regulatory standards in effect at the time of facility construction. See Agency Record,
Petitioners' Exhibit D. D7HD approved plans for a subdivision application on July 30, 1999, which
included a central septic system, and lifted ail sanitary restrictions. See Agency Record, Respondent's
Exhibit 3. SiPP relied on such inspections and approvals to develop the property and began selling
multiple lots to third-party owners. in 2002, Sunnyside Utilities was formed and began providing, and
continues to provide, sewer and water service to multiple iots in the subdivision. (R. p. 7-8).
In June of 2006, Sunnyside Utiiities' septic system was temporarily overloaded by the illegal and
excessive discharges by the tenant occupying one parcel in the subdivision. (R. p. 8). Pursuant to an
approved permit, Sunnyside Utilities expanded its septic system and resolved the temporary overload.
However, D7HD then unilaterally and without authority decided to require that the newly expanded
septic system be abandoned and replaced by either a large soil absorption system ("LSAS") or a
connection to the City of ldaho Falls' wastewater treatment facilities. After failing to reach an
agreement with Sunnyside for installation of an LSAS or connection to the City, D7HD decided to impose

sanctions against Sunnyside by issuing a certificate of disapproval and reimposing sanitary restrictions
on the entire subdivision. See Agency Record, Document 13. However, authority to reimpose sanitary
restrictions on a central septic system was not delegated to D7HD and its officers and directors cleariy
knew that they were acting without any basis in law or fact. (R. p. 107).
D7HD's jurisdiction over private septic systems is derived solely from the Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU") between D7HD and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. (R. p. 15).
Under the MOU, DEQ retained authority to "[alpprove plans and specifications, and provide written
comments to Districts on central systems...." (R. p. 23). D7HD is only delegated authority to "[tlake
appropriate action to enforce Individual/Subsurface Sewage Disposal Rules." (R. p. 23). Initially,
"[slanitary restrictions were lifted by D7HD on the basis of a 'Central Septic' system." See Agency
Record, Respondent's Exhibit 3, emphasis added. Since Sunnyside's septic system has always been a
central system, it falls under the sole jurisdiction of DEQ, and no regulatory authority was delegated to
D7HD. (R. p. 23). The MOU establishes that "when re-imposition of sanitaw restrictions is required, the
responsible agency should act." (R. p. 20, emphasis added). In spite of the complete lack of regulatoiy
authority, D7HD unilaterally and arbitrarily proceeded to reimpose sanitary restrictions on Sunnyside
because DEQ was "sitting on it." See Testimony of D7HD Director Richard Horne, Transcript of January
25,2007 Hearing, p. 38, In. 19-23.
Sunnyside appealed the reimposition of sanitary restrictions to the District Director, Richard 0.
Horne, who upheld the restriction reimposition. See Agency Record, Document 9. Mr. Horne usurped
authority rightly retained by DEQ and sought to justify the assumption of power by including a caveat
that his decision would stand "unless written documentation is submitted to us by DEQasking us not to
re-impose sanitary restrictions...." See Agency Record, Document 9. Such a statement does not create
any jurisdiction where clearly none existed. Mr. Horne knew that "DEQ is the responsible party for
approving plans and specifications on central systems as defined in the rules." See Agency Record,

Document 9. At a later hearing before the District Board of Health, Mr. Horne personally acknowledged
that "central systems are the responsibility of DEQ. They always have been." See Transcript of January
25, 2007 hearing, pg. 38, In. 19-20. As a further violation of Sunnyside's due process rights, Mr. Horne's
decision was based upon a "Corrected" Notice of Intent to Re-Impose Sanitary Restrictions, which was
issued after completion of the appeal hearing. See Agency Record, Document 9.
Sunnyside appealed the Director's decision to the D7HD Board of Health, which upheld the
reimposition of sanitary restrictions. See Transcript of June 21, 2007 Hearing, p. 63, In. 6-17. However,
multiple members of the Board acknowledged on the record that only DEQ had jurisdiction over
Sunnyside Utilities' central sewer system. (R. p. 107). The following comments were made by some
board members:
Commissioner Robinson: "I think it should be now turned back to DEQ...and let them handle it.
They're more equipped to handle the large ones than the small ones." SeeTranscript of June
21, 2007 Hearing, pg. 37, in. 8-13.
Commissioner Radford: "I guess I'd like to modify our decision that we give it to DEQ because
this problem's become a DEQ problem. So, I'd like to modify our previous decision that we
made to give this size of a system to DEQ...When it gets t o these other kinds I think even the
Director I've heard him say before that DEQ- that's what a memorandum of understanding is
for. That's who ought to be doing this ...l think it's incumbent upon us to modify our decision
and say this system has become so large that it's out of our expertise as a District of Health."
SeeTranscript of June 21,2007 Hearing, pg. 45, In. 13-17, pg. 46, in. 21-24 and pg. 55,in. 20-23.

-

-

Doctor Barbara Nelson, M.D.: "I thought that from the first hearing, that this should be decided
by DEQ...[ 11s there any way we can make a decision to turn it over to DEQ..." See Transcript of
June 21,2007 Hearing, pg. 39, In. 17-18 and pg. 39, In. 25 though pg. 40, In. 2.
In the end, the Board of Health decided "to uphold the sanitary restrictions and to encourage the
applicant t o work with DEQ to remedy the situation." See Transcript of June 21,2007 Hearing, pg. 60,
In. 20-22 (emphasis added). The Board clearly recognized that it did not have jurisdiction over
Sunnyside's central system, yet claimed authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions. (R. p. 107). The
MOU clearly states that "when re-imposition of sanitary restrictions is required, the responsible agency

should act." (R. p. 20, emphasis added). DEQ was the agency responsible for central systems when
sanitary restrictions were reimposed.
Having exhausted its administrative remedies, Sunnyside then filed a civil action, combining a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment regarding D7HD jurisdiction and a request for Judicial Review, in the
event jurisdiction was found, with the Seventh Judiciai District Court for Bonneville County. (R. p. 5). In
the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, Judge Joel Tingey determined that D7HD acted
without authority and that ail of D7HD's actions were void. (R. p. 100). Judge Tingey held that "effective
in 2001 the statute [governing reimposition of sanitary restrictions (Idaho Code § SO-1326)l was
amended to place such authority with DEQ." (R. p. 105). Based upon this amendment, "the authority to
reimpose sanitary restrictions through the 'issuance of a certificate of disapproval' rested with DEQ." (R.
p. 105). Although "a public health district is granted a general power and duty t o 'do all things required
for the preservation and protection of the public health...' (I.C. 5 39-414(2)), such a general statement
can not be considered to grant authority over matters specifically assigned to DEQ." (R. p. 105). Judge
Tingey also ruled that "at all times relevant the septic system utilized by [Sunnyside] fell within the
definition of a central system." (R. p. 106). Therefore, "[tlhere is nothing under Section II B of the MOU
suggesting that the health districts are given authority over central systems or specifically, authority to
reimpose sanitary restrictions as to a central system." (R. p. 107). Judge Tingey further noted "that
statements made by District Seven personnel. . . indicate an understanding and acknowledgement that
DEQ has retained . . . control over central systems." (R. p. 107). D7HD had no authority and it is clear
from the record that D7HD Director, employees and Board members all knew that it lacked any
authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions on Sunnyside.
Having obtained the desired declaratory judgment relief, making Judicial Review unnecessary,
Sunnyside filed a Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121. (R. p.
112-12). After finding that Sunnyside was the prevailing party and D7HD knowingly acted without

authority, Judge Tingey awarded costs to Sunnyside but denied both the Motion for Attorney Fees and a
Motion for Reconsideration. (R. p. 164 and 200-1). On the Motion for Attorney Fees, Judge Tingey
denied ldaho Code Section 12-117 fees on the basis that D7HD was not a 'state agency.' (R. p. 165).
Judge Tingey further ruled that D7HD acted with a reasonable basis because the septic tank was
overflowing and that would be a public health concern prompting some kind of action. (R. p. 165-66).
Judge Tingey also ruled that the "matter was not brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation" as required t o award fees under ldaho Code Section 12-121. (R.
p. 167). in the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Tingey upheld
his previous Order that D7HD was not a 'state agency' and further ruled that a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Judicial Review did not qualify as a 'civil action' necessary t o recover attorney fees under
ldaho Code Section 12-121. (R. p. 200-1 - 200-4). Sunnyside now appeals these denials t o the Supreme
Court o f ldaho and also seeks attorney fees on appeal. This appeal addresses Sunnyside's entitlement to
attorney fees, not the amount to be awarded.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Is Sunnyside entitled to attorney fees against District Seven Health Department pursuant to
ldaho Code 5 12-117?

II.
Is Sunnyside entitled to attorney fees against District Seven Health Department pursuant t o
ldaho Code 5 12-121?

111.

Is Sunnyside entitled to attorney fees on appeal as prevailing party?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since 1999, Idaho's Supreme Court has applied a de novo or free review standard when
reviewing I.C. 5 12-117 cases. Rincover v. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 ldaho 547,549,976 P.2d 473
(1999); see also In Re Estate of Elliott, 141 ldaho 177,183 (2005). The "Court has the constitutional and
statutory obligation ultimately to determine the law in any proceeding brought to the Court for Review."
Rincover V. State, Dept. of Finance, 132 ldaho a t 550. Further, "[tlhe Court is not bound by the district
court's decision as to whether, as a matter of law, the activities of an agency or other enumerated
governmentalentity had a 'reasonable basis in ... [the] law' so as to satisfy the predicate for an award of
attorney fees pursuant to the statute." Id. at 550 (emphasis added),
Concerning I.C. 5 12-121, "a decision to award attorney fees is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard." Stout v. Key Training Corp. 144 ldaho 195,196,158 P.3d 971 (2007)(citing
Contreras v. Rubley, 142 ldaho 573,576, 130 P.3d 1111,1114 (2006)). "However, when an award of
attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard of review for statutory
interpretation applies." Id. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [the] Court
exercises free review." 144 ldaho a t 196 (citing Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. #84, 142 ldaho
804,807,134 P.3d 655,658 (2006)).

ARGUMENT
1. SUNNYSIDE SHOULD RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST DISTRICT SEVEN HEALTH

DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 5 12-117.
Sunnyside should recover attorney fees from D7HD because ldaho statute entitles a prevailing
party to attorney fees if a state agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. ldaho Code § 12117(1) reads as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving
as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without
a reasonable basis in fact or law.
In Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, the Court found that the purpose of I.C. 5 12-117 is
two-fold: "(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a
remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should ha[ve] made." 107 ldaho
854,859,693 P.2d 1056 (1984). In Rincover v. State, Dept of Finance, the Court "noted that I.C. § 12117 is not a discretionary statute; but it provides that the court shall award attorney fees where the
state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law...." 132 ldaho at 549 (emphasis added).
In order for Sunnyside to receive attorney fees under I.C.

5 12-117, the Court must answer three

questions. First, was Sunnyside the prevailing party? Second, is D7HD a 'state agency' for purposes of
I.C. 5 12-117?Third, did D7HD act without a reasonable basis in fact or law? If all three questions are

answered affirmatively, then an award of attorney fees to Sunnyside is mandatory.
a. Was Sunnyside the prevailing party?
The District Court held that D7HD acted without authority and that all D7HD's actions were void.
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9 (R. p. 108). This decision has not been challenged by D7HD.
In a subsequent order, the District Court specifically held that "the Court considers [Sunnyside] to be the

prevailing party in this matter." Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney
Fees, p. 1(R. p. 164). It is clear that Sunnyside was the prevailing party, having obtained the Declaratory
Judgment relief sought, avoiding any need for Judicial Review.
b. Is D7HD a 'state agency' for purposes of I.C. 5 12-117?
The District Court relied upon I.C. 5 39-401 to hold that it was the "legislative intent ...that health
districts were not state agencies." Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney
Fees, p. 2 (R. p. 165). In a single convoluted passage the legislature completely contradicts itself when it
claims that "[ilt is legislative intent that health districts operate and be recognized not as state agencies
or departments, but as governmental entities whose creation has been authorized by the state....'I
ldaho Code 5 39-401. However, the legislature identifies only one purpose for not calling the health
districts a 'state agency,' which is to exempt the districts "from the required participation in the services
of the purchasing agent or employee liability coverage, as rendered by the department of
administration." Id. Nowhere in the statute does the legislature exempt the health districts from having
to pay attorney fees resulting for acting without a reasonable basis in law or fact, or from the application
of I.C. 5 12-117 specifically.
ldaho Code 5 12-117(4)(b)states that "For purposes of this section: 'State agency' shall mean
any agency as defined in Section 67-5201, ldaho Code." (Emphasis added). Case law supports reliance
upon 5 67-5201 in determining whether an entity is classified as a 'state agency'. See Bott v. ldaho State
Bldg. Authority, 122 ldaho 471,479,835 P.2d 1282 (1992); Fox v. Board of County Com'rs, 121 ldaho
686,692,827 P.2d 699 (1991). ldaho Code 5 67-5201(2) defines an agency as'leach state board,
commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases...."
(Emphasis added). D7HD qualifies under both categories as a 'state agency' because it is authorized by
law to make rules and is empowered to determine contested cases.

ldaho Code 5 39-416, entitled 'Rules Adopted by District Board', states that "[tlhe district board
by the affirmative vote of a majority of its members may adopt, amend or rescind rules and standards as
it deems necessary t o carry out the purposes and provisions of [Idaho Code 55 39-408 - 39-414,39-415

- 39-423, 39-4261.'' D7HD had expressly admitted that "public heath districts ...have rule making
authority of their own. idaho Code 55 39-413 and 39-416." (R. p. 84).
ldaho Code 5 39-417, entitled 'Hearings by District Board', allows that any alleged violator o f the
district board's rules may "seek a hearing before the district board." Section 39-417 further states that
"the district board or its agent shall have the same powers and authority set out i n subsection (3) of
section 39-107, ldaho Code." ldaho Code Section 39-107(3) sets forth the authority that the ldaho
Department of Environmental Quality, a state agency, has been granted t o further its duties. This
authority includes "the power to administer oaths, certify to official acts, and t o issue subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, documents and testimony."
Idaho Code 5 39-107(3). Although D7HD lacks jurisdiction over central septic systems, when D7HD is
within its jurisdiction, it is empowered both t o issue rules and hear contested cases, meeting all o f the
definitional requirements of a state agency required by both ldaho Code 55 12-117 and 67-S201(2).
ldaho courts have addressed on several occasions whether an entity is a 'state agency' under I.C.

5 12-117, unfortunately the courts have not addressed District Health Departments specifically. In 8 o t t
v. ldaho State Bldg. Authority, one factor that the Court said should be considered is the name o f the
entity. 122 ldaho 471,479,835 P.2d 1282 (1992). D7HD reimposed sanitary restrictions, using the
D7HD letterhead, on November 28,2006. (R. p. 30). D7HD changed its name in January, 2007, after the
reimposition complained o f had already occurred. See generally R. p. 47 (dated January 25,2007, the
letter from Mark Trupp carries the Eastern ldaho Public Health District letterhead: "Upon deliberation o f
Eastern ldaho Public Health District's (i.e. District Seven Health Department) Board of Health...."). At the
beginning of this civil action, Eastern ldaho Public Health District was actually called District Seven

Health Department. Further, the first line in ldaho Code 5 39-409 says "[tlhere is hereby created and
established in each of the ...p ublic health districts a district health department." ldaho Code 5 39-409
(emphasis added). ldaho Code 5 39-410 states that "[tlhere is hereby created and established in each of
the public health districts a district board of health...." ldaho Code 5 39-410 (emphasis added). The
terms 'department' and 'board' are two of the four descriptive words included in I.C. 5 67-5201(2) to
identify a state agency. The term 'district'simply refers to the Eastern ldaho geographical area that is
served, and is not a descriptive characteristic of the entity itself. Changing the name does not change
the fact that D7HD qualifies as a 'state agency' for I.C. 5 12-117 purposes, being both a board and a
department.
The broad reach o f I.C. 12-117 is further noted in Rincover v. Stote, Dept. of Finance, where the
court applies the section to "the activities of an agency or other enumerated governmentcrl entity...."
132 ldaho 547,550,976 P.2d 473 (1999) (emphasis added). Although the legislature created an
exemption from one expressly enumerated state agency requirement by claiming that D7HD was not a
state agency, the legislature still recognized that D7HD is a "governmental entit[y] whose creation has
been authorized by the state." ldaho Code 5 39-401.
ldaho courts have held that "when t w o governmental promulgations are i n irreconcilable
conflict, the one enacted later in time governs.'' Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 1 0 1 ldaho 305,307, 612
P.2d 542 (1980). Further, "it is established that a specific statute will control over a general statute
when the t w o are in conflict." Id. at 307. Not only is ldaho Code 5 12-117 more specific than 5 39-401
by expressly stating what will be classified as a state agency for purposes o f assessing attorney fees, it is
also more recent in both enactment and amendment. ldaho Code 5 39-401 was enacted in 1976 and
amended in 1986, whereas ldaho Code 5 12-117 was enacted in 1984 and most recently amended in
2000.

D7HD is trying to carve itself into an exception where it can claim the benefits of being a state
agency, but avoid the liabilities attendant to that agency status. Although, as Judge Tingey pointed out,
"[tlhe proper characterization of a health district is not readily apparent from ldaho case or statutory
law", See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2 (R. p. 165), D7HD qualifies as a 'state agency' for the
purposes of I.C.

5 12-117 and should not be exempt from accountability for knowingly acting beyond its

jurisdiction. The issue is whether D7HD falls under the necessary requirements promulgated by I.C.

5

12-117, regardless of what the legislature chooses t o call the department and its board. If it waddles
like a duck, smells like a duck, and quacks like a duck, the legislature cannot call it an eagle to avoid
hunting season. D7HD was created like a state agency, enacts rules like a state agency, hears contested
cases like a state agency and cannot avoid ldaho Code 5 12-117 by calling itself a district.
c.

Did D7HD act without a reasonable basis in fact o r law?

ldaho case law directly holds that "where a state agency had no authority t o order a particular
action, it acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 ldaho
894,898,828 P.2d 1299 (1992) (citing Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Comm'n, 117 ldaho 949,793
P.2d 181 (1990)).
The District Court found "that authority t o reimpose sanitary restrictions was statutorily granted
t o DEQ, and not to public health districts directly." See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 6 (R. p.
105). The District Court also found that under the Memorandum o f Understanding between D7HD and
the ldaho Department o f Environmental Quality, "DEQ reserved authority t o approve plans and
specifications for [Sunnyside's system]." Id, at p. 7 (R. p. 106). The District Court further found that "it is
clear under the MOU that there is no intent for there to be a duplication or overlap of authority
between DEQ and the health districts t o reimpose sanitary restriction." Id. at p. 8 (R. p. 107). The
District Court expressly ruled that "District Seven's issuance of a Certificate o f Disapproval and its
reimposition o f sanitary restrictions on the subject property were without authority." Id. at p. 9 (R. p.

108). The District Court also explicitly found that "statements made by District Seven personnel as
contained in the Agency Record indicate an understanding and acknowledgement that DEQ has retained
such control over central systems." Id. at p. 8 (R. p. 107). D7HD acted without authority, and absolutely
understood that absence of authority before it acted. Id. a t p. 8 (R. p. 107). D7HD has not challenged
these holdings.
However, the District Court acted inconsistently when Judge Tingey ruled that he "does not
believe that the actions of [D7HD] were without a reasonable basis in fact or law." See Memorandum
Decision and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, p. 2 (R. p. 165). Judge Tingey relied on the
premise that "Petitioner's septic tank was overflowing causing sewage to pool on the surface of the
property ...creatling] a public health concern reasonably prompting some action on the part of [D7HD]."
Id. at p. 2-3 (R. p. 165-166). "Some action" did not include reimposition of sanitary restrictions on the
entire subdivision. This is strikingly similar to what occurred in In re Estate of Elliott:
In ruling from the bench on the personal representative's request for attorney fees, the district
court noted that, "[slo although I ruled in the [personal representative's] favor and although I
found that the State action was without a basis in law, as did [the magistrate judge], I do not
find that the action was so unreasonable or crossed that broad canyon that I think is required in
12-117." The district court found that the Department's actions were without a basis in law but
were not unreasonable. This determination is inconsistent considering the circumstances of the
case.
141 Idaho 177,184, 108 P.3d 324 (2005). The Elliott Appellate Court concluded that because the
"Department acted without statutory authority.

. . [its] actions in this case were unreasonable and

without a basis in law." Id. at 184. Based upon this finding, "I.C.

5 12-117 required the district court to

award attorney fees where the Department's actions were brought without a basis in law." Id. a t 184
(emphasis added). As in the present case, "[tlhe district court correctly perceived the law but failed to
properly apply I.C.

(5 12-1171.'' Id. at 184.

This Appellate Court should similarly hold that Judge Tingey

ruled inconsistently in denying Sunnyside's attorney fee request and that D7HD, acting without
authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions, acted without a reasonable basis in law.
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2. SUNNYSIDE SHOULD RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST DISTRICT SEVEN HEALTH
DEPARTMENT PURSUANTTO IDAHO CODE 5 12-121
Under ldaho Code 5 12-121, "[iln any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party or parties...." However, the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure limit attorney's
fees to actions that are "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." See I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e). If the Court finds that this is a civil action and that D7HD acted
unreasonably or without foundation, Sunnyside is entitled to attorney's fees under I.C.
a.

5 12-121.

Is a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review a 'Civil Action'?

ldaho courts have concluded that "an appeal from an agency decision...is not a civil action . . .
commenced by filing a complaint with the court." State v. Christensen, 131 ldaho 138,142,953 P.2d
578 (1998). However, the ldaho Supreme Court has expressly left open the possibility that a petition for
declaratory relief could be treated as a complaint and qualify as a civil action. 131 ldaho at 143.
Unfortunately the Christensen Court did not rule on whether a declaratory judgment action qualifies for
§ 12-121 relief, holding that attorney fees would not be appropriate when addressing an area of the law

(statutory interpretation of chapter 13, title 50 of the ldaho Code) that was not well settled. Id. at 143.
In the very recent case of Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, Docket No. 33174 (ldaho
6-18-2008), the ldaho Supreme Court acknowledged that a civil action for declaratory judgment can be
combined with a separate Petition for Judicial Review. Id. at p. 6, n.2. This is exactly what was done by
Sunnyside in the present civil action, although no Judicial Review ever occurred.
In this action, Judge Tingey ruled that "[rlegardless of how a petition or complaint may be styled
or named, the dispositive question is whether the action is an appeal from an administrative matter."
See Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3 (R. p. 200-3). This is an
erroneous interpretation, as ldaho Appellate Courts have held that the 'dispositive question' is whether
the proceedings can be classified as a civil action commenced by filing a complaint with the court. State
v. Christensen, 131 ldaho at 138. In Lowery v. Board of County Com'rs the court explained that the
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Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Tax ruling allowed attorney fees if a party filed a complaint against
an administrative ruling, rather than simply an appeal. 117 ldaho 1079, 1082,793 P.2d 1251 (1990).
The District Court here incorrectly held that "the action initiated by [Sunnyside], regardless of its
label, was an appeal of an administrative decision." See Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion
for Reconsideration, p. 4 (R. p. 200-4). Sunnyside's petition sought declaratory judgment regarding the
extent of D7HD's authority. Attorney fees are not allowed in an action that is purely an administrative
appeal, but are allowed if a complaint is filed against an administrative ruling pursuant to ldaho Rules of
Civil Procedure 3(a). Id. a t 1082. Under ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure 3(a)(l), "[a] civil action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court, which may be denominated as a complaint,
petition, or application...." (Emphasis added). It is not necessary that the pleading be called a
complaint.
This Court must determine that a petition for declaratory judgment, although combined with a
request for judicial review, is correctly classified as a civil action. The Christensen Court recognized the
potential of allowing I.C.

5 12-121 attorney fees for exactly such a situation, but did not give an answer.

131 ldaho at 143. Sunnyside requests that this Court hold that a declaratory judgment action addressing
the extent of D7HD's jurisdiction is a civil action under lRCP 3(a) and ldaho Code Section 12-121. This i s
particularly true when the declaratory judgment avoids the need for the Judicial Review. The result in
this case would be exactly the same if only a declaratory judgment action had been filed.
b. Did D7HD defend frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation?
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l)states that "attorney fees under section 12-121, ldaho
Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." "An award of attorney
fees under ldaho Code 5 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only
when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or

defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." McGrew v. McGrew, 139 ldaho 551, 562, 82
P.3d 833,844 (2003). "Ordinarily, attorney fees will not be awarded where the losing party brought the
appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented." In Re Twin Falls County Comm.
Resolution No. 2001-4,139 ldaho 131, 136,75 P.3d 185 (2003). "It is not [the appellate court's] function
on appeal of an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)to engage in fact
finding...[the appellate court's] function is to review the trial court's finding to determine if it is
supported by the record." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. ldaho Power, 119 ldaho 87,92,803 P.2d 993
(1990).
As noted in Section 1(C), supra, the District Court held that D7HD acted without statutory
authority when the Department and its Board of Health reimposed sanitary restrictions on Sunnyside.
ldaho case law clearly holds that "where a state agency had no authority to order a particular action, it
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Lockhart v. Dept. of Fish and Game, 121 ldaho 894,
898,828 P.2d 1299 (1992) (citing Moosman v. ldaho Horse Racing Camm'n, 117 ldaho 949,793 P.2d 181
(1990)). Judge Tingey abused his discretion when he found that D7HD did not defend unreasonably or
without foundation. D7HD knew it lacked all authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions against
Sunnyside and any attempt to assert authority that D7HD knew it did not have was unreasonable and
without foundation. It should not be found reasonable for a state agency to defend an action that is
acknowledged by its Board Members and Director to be outside the authority of the state agency.
3.

SUNNYSIDE SHOULD RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
In Spidell v. Jenkins, the ldaho Court of Appeals addressed attorney fees on appeal and ruled

that "[wlhen an appeal concerns attorney fees alone, such an award will be made to the prevailing party
if the issue on appeal includes the entitlement to a fee award below and is not limited t o the amount."
111ldaho 857, 861, 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986)(citingDeWlls Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 ldaho 288,

678 P.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1984)).

In the present case, the sole issue on appeal is Sunnyside's entitlement t o attorney fees, not the
amount. Under Idaho Code 55 12-117 and 12-121, as prevailing party Sunnyside should also be awarded
attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The two-fold purpose of ldaho Code T, 12-117 is: "(1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or
arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies
should never ha[ve] made." Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Tax, 107 ldaho 854,859,693 P.2d
1056 (1984). Further, "[tlhe clear purpose of [I.C. 5 12-1211.

. . is to reimburse the successful party for

legal fees incurred in prosecuting his or her legal rights." Id. a t 858 (citing Minich v. Gem State
Developers, 99 ldaho 911,918,591 P.2d 1078,1085 (1979)). In Bogner, the ldaho Supreme Court found
"nothing in § 12-121which establishes that the legislature intended to deny awards of attorney's fees
for costs incurred in pursuing an administrative remedy prior to instigating the very civil action which
necessarily resulted when that effort failed." Id. at 858. Allowing D7HD to fall into some middle no
man's land where the department is immune from either statute would frustrate the very purpose of
holding state agencies accountable for their mistakes. Since the District Court determined that D7HD
knew it lacked any authority to act against Sunnyside, yet acted anyway without basis in law or fact,
D7HD should be held accountable for the financial burden that Sunnyside has had to bear for correcting
the mistakes this Department and its Board of Health never should have made. Sunnyside is entitled to
attorney fees at the administrative, trial court and appellate levels.
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